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Abstract 
Halal certification of financials product may reduce transaction costs for its buyers when it 
provides a trusted standard for investors that seek to comply with Islamic law. However, we 
show that in practice it takes considerable amounts of time (20 days ) and money (USD 122,000) 
to obtain a halal certification. Mainly, this is because the market is very concentrated and forms 
a closed circuit. About 20 Sharia scholars control more than half the market, of which the top 3 
earn an estimated USD 4.5 mln in fees per year. Moreover this market seems plagued by a 
number of problems, most notably a strong incentive to be excessively lenient in certification, 
sub-standard governance practices, lack of consensus regarding certification standards and 
limited knowledge of finance. Therefore it is questionable whether the reduction in transaction 
costs through halal certification outweighs the costs of certification. Consolidation of the 
numerous ways halal certification can be obtained and moving halal certification more into the 
public goods sphere, where a neutral non-profit government induced party should assume the 
current role of the halal certifiers, may enhance the reputation of certifies and reduce the 
transaction costs associated with halal certification.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Standardization and certification are well known methods to reduce transaction costs. From that 
perspective we look at the economics of certifying financial products as Islamic. Islamic law 
(Sharia) obligates Muslims to only invest in assets that are halal (permissible according to 
Islam). However, specific knowledge is needed to assess whether a financial  product is in fact 
halal. Consequently, a market has been created that fulfils this need, the market for halal 
certification of financial products. This market has some very interesting features with respect to 
value creation by providing a quality standard. Moreover, as the demand for Islamic financial 
products increases, research on Islamic banking (e.g. Khan, 2010) and investing (e.g. Hayat and 
Kraeussl, 2011; Hoepner, Rammal and Rezec, 2011) is also on the rise. However it seems that 
the market for halal certification obtained very limited attention in the analysis of economics 
institutions, which is odd, since halal certification is the key feature that separates Islamic from 
conventional finance.  
 
We aim to fill the gap in two ways. First, we describe the market for (financial) halal certificates 
and the process of getting such a certification. Second, we identify inefficiencies in this process 
using transaction cost theory and an empirical investigation. From a transaction cost perspective, 
the market for halal financial products is characterized by large information asymmetries 
between buyers and sellers. The buyer does not know whether the financial product is in fact 
halal or not and has to invest time and money in finding this out. Thus, buying a halal financial 
product is accompanied with high transaction costs. Certification of such products (in theory) has 
the potential to increase welfare by reducing these transaction costs. However, our analysis 
reveals that in practice this objective is not achieved and the problem of information asymmetry 
has just been shifted from one  between buyers and sellers to one between sellers and certifiers. 
Sellers have to make substantial costs and invest time in getting their products certified as halal. 
Partially, this is because the market is controlled by a select few Sharia scholars, some of whom 
make an estimated USD 4.5 mln per year in fees for certifying financial products. It seems that 
institutions of halal certification are still in an early stage of development, and that halal 
certification has not yet reached the stage, where there are only a few worldwide trusted 
standards. This latter stage is characteristic for a mature market for certification and standards, 
which is from the perspective of network externalities in principle a “winner takes all” market. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II introduces Islamic finance. 
Section III describes Sharia scholars. Section IV describes a typical certification process. Section 
V discusses halal certification as a standard and the channels through which it could reduce 
transaction costs. Based on that analysis Section VI gives some recommendations. Finally 
section VII concludes and makes suggestions for further research. 
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II. Islamic finance and the basics of halal certificatoin 
 
Islamic finance is a broad term used for all financial transactions that are permissible by Islamic 
law (Sharia)1. The main building blocks are the prohibition of riba (interest), gharar (excessive 
risk), maysir (gambling) and industries that are considered unethical such as alcohol and 
pornography. These restrictions imply that Muslims cannot receive or pay interest, they should 
exactly know the countervalue that is offered in a transaction, they may not speculate and they 
may not derive profit from unethical industries. It follows that next to investing in conventional 
bonds, most derivatives and structured products is prohibited. Investment products that comply 
with Sharia law are called halal, products that do not comply are called haram. 
 
Taking entrepreneurial risk to earn profit, however, is allowed. According to Kuran (2004), 
Islamic finance in its current form began around the partitioning of India and Pakistan as an 
attempt to strengthen the Muslim identity. It was most notably advocated by the Pakistani 
scholar Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979). Arguably the first Islamic bank was incepted in Egypt 
in 1963 (the Mit Ghamr Islamic Bank). Although initially focused on banking, the industry has 
branched out over capital markets and insurance as well. Nowadays, there are over 400 Islamic 
financial institutions operating in 39 countries offering products/services such as banking, 
equities, mutual funds, insurance and even bonds, so called Sukuks (General Council for Islamic 
Banks and Financial Institutions, 2009). In terms of size it is a relatively modest market, but it 
has been growing very fast (15 percent per year) for a number of years (Khan, 2010). Banking 
assets are estimated to be USD 1 trillion in 2010 (Shanmugam and Zahiri, 2009; Hoepner et al. 
2011) and with a potential market of more than a billion Muslims worldwide these assets are 
expected to continue growing. 
 
In order for a financial products to be considered halal, it must be certified as such by experts in 
Islamic law, called Sharia scholars. Specifically, these scholars should be experts in Fiqh Al 
Muamalat, which is Islamic commercial law. There are different views however on what is 
considered halal or not depending on which school of thought the certifying scholar adheres to. 
To understand the differences in these schools of thought we must first introduce the sources of 
Islamic law. Shanmugam and Zahari (2009) give a good overview, they indicate that there are 
major and minor sources of Islamic law. The main two sources are the Quran, which is the holy 
book of the Muslims and Hadith, which are the reported sayings and actions of the Prophet 
Mohammed. Whatever is explicitly mentioned in the Quran or Hadith is considered Islamic law. 
On matters not explicitly discussed herein (and there are many of those) Islamic scholars can 
debate and if they reach consensus, that consensus becomes law (Ijma). Qiyas is the method of 
deducting law from analogy. Essentially, it is using a preceding ruling from Islamic law and 
applying it to cases that contain the same elements addressed by that ruling. Other (minor) ways 
to derive law are Ijtihad (personal interpretation of a Sharia scholar), Istislah (taking the public 
interest into account), Istihsan (juristic preference, exceptions to Islamic law to avoid unfairness) 
and Urf (custom, i.e. local or regional practice). 
 
Schools of thought on Islamic law differ mainly in their acceptance of the various sources of law. 
The liberal views accept more sources while the stricter views accept less sources. Shanmugam 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed introduction to Islamic finance we refer to e.g. Visser (2009), Shanmugam and Zahiri (2009) 
and El Gamal (2006). 
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and Zahiri (2009) and Visser (2009) give a concise overview of the four most widely accepted 
schools of thought2. From most to least liberal, they are: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. The 
Hanafi view is most popular. It is based on the writings of Abu Hanifa in 767 and allows 
personal interpretation (Ijtihad), reasoning by analogy (Qiyas), consensus among Islamic 
scholars (Ijma), juristic preference (Istihsan) and custom (Urf). The Maliki view (founded by 
Malik Ibn Anas in 795) strongly relies on Hadith but also allows Ijma, Qiyas and arguably Urf. 
The Shafi'i view (founded by Muhammad Ibn Idris Al-Shafi'i in 819) relies mostly on Hadith. It 
does not allow Ijtihad and Istihsan but does allow Ijma and Qiyas. The Hanbali school is most 
strict. It was founded by Ahmad Hanbal in 855 and follows a literal interpretation of the Quran. 
According to this view, the Quran and Hadith are the sole sources of law. It does not allow law 
based on interpretation and consensus. 
 
The important countries for Islamic finance differ quite a bit in the schools of thought they 
follow (Visser, 2009). Malaysia for example follows the Shafi'i view, while Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia follow the Maliki and Hanbali view respectively. It might be one of the reasons there are 
no widely accepted standards for Islamic finance. It may also be a reason that in this case the 
market for certification and standardization will not evolve to a “winner takes all” market but 
that in the end there will be a few competing halal certifiers, which reflect the different schools 
of thought. Partly because countries adhere to different schools of tought, there is, as yet, no 
widely accepted authority that oversees and can legally enforce the quality of halal certification 
for financial products. Apparently because of these different schools of thought the network 
externalities of standardization, which may bring about a “winner takes all” market (see e.g. 
Schilling, 2002), are not (yet) large enough to come to one or a few uniform standards of halal 
certification. 
 
There are, however, a number of important standard setting bodies (Table I). The most well 
known and influential are the Bahrain based Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Malaysian Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). 
Both organizations issue standards on interpretation of Islamic law with the AAOIFI focusing 
more on accounting and auditing and the IFSB focusing on risk management and corporate 
governance. Others are the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board’s (MASB), the International 
Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the Liquidity Management Centre (LMC). The MASB is 
similar to (and works closely with) the AAOIFI, but has a focus on Malaysia. The IIFM and the 
LMC are private companies that provide liquidity for secondary markets of certain Islamic 
financial instruments (mostly Sukuk bonds). In addition, the International Islamic Rating Agency 
(IIRA) provides credit and Sharia compliance ratings for financial institutions. Interestingly, 
while in most cases Sharia compliance is binary (either halal or haram), the IIRA provides 
Sharia ratings ranging from AAA to B. Here AAA stands for the highest level of Sharia 
compliance while B indicates the entity/instrument is Sharia compliant but has weaknesses in 
some areas of Sharia quality. A rating below B would thus be considered non Sharia compliant. 
This is another example of difficulties for common consumers to evaluate Islamic financial 
products. It is not quite clear whether financial products can in fact be considered just halal or 
                                                 
2 Islam can (arguably) be divided in two main groups, Sunni and Shia. Here, we follow the law schools of Sunni 
Islam, to which the largest part (~85%) of Muslims belong to and which are most widely followed. Shia Muslims 
mainly follow the Jafari school of thought, but the differences with the Sunni schools are not very large (Visser, 
2009). 
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not or whether a certification should indicate the level of Sharia compliance as with the IIRA 
ratings. A possible reason for the halal or haram criterion might be found in Lizzeri (1999), who 
shows that that quality certifiers have an incentive to use crude rating intervals (e.g. pass or fail) 
even if they observe true product quality with zero costs. A final observation of table I is the 
influence of Bahrain, as most of the important standard setting bodies in Islamic finance are 
based there. Malaysia is the second most influential country in Islamic finance. It may 
foreshadow that on the further road to a “winner takes all” market, in the end there will be two 
competing world standards for halal certification, namely that of Bahrain, and that of  Malaysia.  
 
     
Table I: Standard Setting Bodies in Islamic Finance 
 
Name Description Website Country
AAOIFI
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) is an 
international organization that prepares accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and 
Shari'a standards for Islamic financial institutions and the industry. Its also provides 
professional designations such as the Certified Islamic Professional Accountant (CIPA) and 
Certified Shari'a Adviser and Auditor (CSAA). The AAOIFI was established on 26 February 
1990 in Algiers. www.aaoifi.com Bahrain
IFSB
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) is an international organization that issues 
standards for the supervision and regulation of Islamic financial institutions. It has 
pronounced on corporate governance, risk management, capital adequacy, upervisory 
review processes, transparency, market discipline, recognition of ratings on Shari’a-
compliant financial instruments, and the development of money markets. It also arranges 
summits, conferences, and workshops on issues relating to Islamic banking. www.ifsb.org Malaysia
MASB
The Malaysian Accounting Standards Board’s (MASB) primary role is to develop accounting 
and financial reporting standards. Its financial reporting standards are developed in 
harmony with the AAOIFI. The standards are developed specifically to meet the needs of 
Islamic financial practices as well as the needs of the regulatory and economic structure in 
Malaysia. www.masb.org.my Malaysia
IIFM
The International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) is an organization dedicated to enhance 
cooperation among Islamic countries and their financial institutions, specifically in promoting 
trading in the secondary market for Shari’a-compliant financial instruments. It does this for 
example by standardizing Islamic financial instruments. www.iif.net Bahrain
IIRA
The Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) is similar to a credit rating agency, but next 
to creditworthiness, it also provides ratings for sharia compliance and corporate governance 
ratings to financial institutions. www.iirating.com Bahrain
LMC
The Liquidity Management Centre (LMC) was established to facilitate investment of the 
surplus funds of Islamic financial institutions into quality short and medium term financial 
instruments structured in accordance with the Shari'a principles. It seeks to develop an 
active secondary market for short-term Shari’a-compliant treasury products. www.lmcbahrain.com Bahrain  
 
Sources: Shanmugam and Zahari (2009), Visser (2009) and websites listed in the table.  
      
III. Sharia scholars 
 
Sharia scholars are crucial for the Islamic Finance industry. El Gamal (2008) even proposes that 
the major source behind the industry growth has been due to Sharia scholars selling their 
expertise. According to El Gamal, they have convinced the Muslim public that conventional 
investing is haram, consequently creating demand for halal investments. Conveniently, the 
eligibility of these investments just happens to be determined by the same people that indicated it 
was haram in the first place. El Gamal's view is not widely held, but is interesting because it 
illustrates the conflict of interest of halal certifiers.  
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According to Zawya.com, a Middle East focused online business intelligence platform, as of 
November 2011 there are 391 Sharia scholars in the World3 and their number seems to be 
growing fast. Zawya.com obtains data from Funds@Work, a consultancy firm specialized in 
Islamic finance. According to their 2010 report, there were only 221 Sharia scholars in 20104. 
The difference between the 391 and 221 scholars may be partially accounted for by better 
coverage and data collection rather than an actual increase in the number of scholars. There is no 
reliable information on how many Sharia advisory firms there are, but they are not as important. 
The industry is driven by the scholars, who often sit together on the same Sharia boards. The 
difference between Sharia advisory firms and Sharia boards in general is that the former act as 
an advisor of parties looking for a certification and intermediate between these parties and Sharia 
scholars. The advisory firms help their clients in the process of applying for a certification. They 
often have a pool of (well known) Sharia scholars which they use to form a Sharia board for 
each certification. In addition they provide consulting and training on how to retain a 
certification. 
 
So who are these scholars? Table II shows the names of the top 20 Sharia scholars based on 
board positions (first column) and positions in standard setting bodies (last column). The first 
and last column show that there is a great amount of overlap between the top 10 scholars based 
on number of boars positions and positions in standard setting bodies. Nearly all the top 10 
scholars based on the former ranking are in the top 20 based on the latter ranking. Thus, the very 
people that control the market are the ones responsible for governing it. Form a corporate 
governance perspective, there seems to be much power concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of people. The concentration indicates that effective monitoring of this market is 
troublesome since the monitors are not independent. In fact, in many ways they are monitoring 
themselves. The situation is comparable to a Board of Supervisors consisting of almost the same 
people as the Board of Directors. 
 
Table II shows some descriptive statistics of the Sharia scholars, based on the 2011 report of 
Funds@Work5. The table shows that the market for financial halal certificates is very 
concentrated. The third column of table II shows the distribution of the top Sharia scholars based 
on the number of Sharia board positions they hold. This can be interpreted as the number of 
financial halal certificates given per year. Column four shows the cumulative percentage market 
share of the top 20 scholars and reveals that the top 20 scholars hold more than 54 percent  of the 
entire market, of which a sizable part (21 percent ) is held by just three scholars. In fact, data 
shows that the top 20 percent  of the scholars control 80 percent  of the market, which is a typical 
Pareto distribution found in many other economic phenomena (Mizuno et al., 2008)6. 
 
     
                                                 
3 Data taken from: http://www.zawya.com/shariahscholars/sch_results.cfm 
4 Taken from:  
www.financeislamiquefrance.fr/useruploads/files/Sharia-Network_by_Funds_at_Work_AG.pdf  
5 Taken from: 
www.funds-at-work.com/fileadmin/downloads/Sharia-Network_by_Funds_at_Work_AG.pdf 
6 Phenomena characterized by Pareto distributions are those in which approximately 80percent of the phenomena is 
caused by 20percent of the cause. Mizuno et al. (2008) for example find that 80percent of revenues of a Japanese 
convenience store chain are attributable to only 20percent of its customers. 
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Table II: Sharia Scholars 
 
Top 20 Sharia Scholars From # of Board % Top 20 scholars in
Positions (cumulative) standard setting bodies
Nizam Mohammed Yacoubi Bahrain 85 7% Abdul Satar Abdul Karim Abu Ghuddah
Abdul Satar Abdul Karim Abu Ghuddah Syria 85 15% Mohammed Daud Bakar
Mohammed Ali Elgari Saudi Arabia 71 21% Mohammed Ali Elgari
Abdul Aziz Khalifa Al-Qassar Kuwait 39 25% Hussein Hamid Hassan
Abdullah Sulaiman Al Manee'a Saudi Arabia 36 28% Ali Mohuddin Al'Qurra Daghi
Hussein Hamid Hassan Egypt 31 30% Nizam Mohammed Yacoubi
Mohammed Daud Bakar Malaysia 27 33% Abdullah Sulaiman Al Manee'a
Essa Zaki Essa Kuwait 27 35% Mohammed Taqi Usmani
Ali Mohuddin Al'Qurra Daghi Qatar 25 37% Yusuf Bin Abdullah Al-Shubaili
Ajeel Jasem Al-Nashmi Kuwait 24 39% Mohammed Amin Ali Qattan
Esam Khalaf Al-Enezi Kuwait 21 41% Mohammed Ali Al-Taskhiri
Esam Mohammed Ishaq Bahrain 21 43% Haji Hashim Haji Yahaya 
Khaled Mathkour Al Mathkour Kuwait 21 45% Mohammed Imran Ashraf Usmani
Mohammed Imran Ashraf Usmani Pakistan 20 47% Mohammed Akram Laldin
Mohammed Taqi Usmani Pakistan 16 48% Mohammed Abdul Rahim Sultan Al Olamaa
Mohammed Abdul Razaq Al-Tabtabae ? 16 50% Ayachi Sedek Feddad
Yusuf Bin Abdullah Al-Shubaili ? 14 51% Abdul Halim Ismail
Abdullah Bin Mohammed Al Mutlaq Saudi Arabia 14 52% Ajeel Jasem Al-Nashmi
Ahmad Bazie Al-Yaseen Kuwait 14 53% Yusuf Talal De Lorenzo
Mohammed Abdulhakim Zoeir United Arab Emirates 14 54% Yusuf Al-Qaradawi
Rest 520 100%
Total 1141  
Source: Funds@Work 
  
 
Most of the top Sharia scholars are from the Middle East (many from Kuwait or Saudi Arabia) 
although Malaysia, Pakistan and Sudan are also represented. The only scholar from a non 
Muslim country is Yusuf Talal de Lorenzo (USA). 
 
Almost all top Sharia scholars have a PhD in Fiqh Al Muamalat (Islamic commercial law). Only 
about a third of the top scholars have a degree in Economics or Finance. Instead Legal Studies 
and Arts are the predominant studies7. This raises the question whether the scholars are 
competent enough to evaluate complex financial products, especially when due to financial 
innovations these products may gain in complexity in coming years. An interesting recent 
development is that an increasing number of Western universities and private companies now 
offer Master level programs and "certificates" in Islamic finance. Some examples are Durham 
University (UK), IE Business School (Spain) and RSM Ersamus Business School (The 
Netherlands). It is not clear though yet, how much merit these programs have in the industry 
 
Egypt is dominant when it comes to universities attended by Sharia scholars. 61 of 320 scholars 
that we identified obtained his degree for an Egyptian university. Second is Saudi Arabia (53 
scholars) and third is Malaysia (44 scholars). The dominance of Egypt is understandable because 
of Al Azhar University, which is widely regarded as one of the most prestigious Islamic 
universities in the world. Saudi Arabia's presence is also understandable as it is where Islam 
began. The popularity of Malaysian universities is interesting given that only 3 of the top 20 
scholars are Malaysian. However it is understandable because Malaysia arguably has the most 
                                                 
7 The educational distribution for the top 100 scholars is very similar to the top 20. We omit it here to conserve 
space. 
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well developed Islamic finance industry of all Muslim countries, mainly due to strong 
government support (Jobst et al., 2008). 
 
    
Table III: Education of Sharia Scholars 
 
Panel A: Supplementary Education 
 
 
Education besides Sharia
Legal Studies 28%
Arts 23%
Economics 23%
Finance 11%
Business Administration 6%
Education 6%
Other 5%
Total 100%  
 
Panel B: Universities Attended by Sharia Scholars  
 
University Country Scholars University Country Scholars
Al Azhar University Egypt 44 Harvard University USA 6
Imam Muhammed Ibn Saud Islamic University Saudi Arabia 25 Qatar University Qatar 5
International Islamic University Malaysia Malaysia 19 International Islamic University Islamabad Pakistan 5
University of Malaya Malaysia 16 Darul Uloom Karachi Pakistan 5
Islamic University of Medina Saudi Arabia 15 University of Chicago USA 4
Umm Al Qura University Saudi Arabia 13 United Arab Emirates University UAE 4
University of Damascus Syria 9 University of Wales Wales 3
University of Cairo Egypt 9 University of Khartoum Sudan 3
University of Jordan Jordan 8 Omdurman Islamic University Sudan 3
Karachi University Pakistan 8 McGill University Canada 3
Ain Shams University Egypt 8 Islamic Science University of Malaysia Malaysia 3
University of Kuwait Kuwait 7 Darul Uloom Deoband India 3
Edinburgh University Scotland 7 Boston University USA 3
University of London England 6 Birmingham University England 3
National University of Malaysia Malaysia 6  
 
Source: Funds@Work 
 
Data from Funds@Work (not shown here) also indicates that the top Sharia scholars tend to sit 
in the same boards together. Scholars that sit in the AAOIFI have an average probability of more 
than 70percent of sharing a board with another AAOIFI member. This indicates that the 
suppliers of halal certification form a rather closed network. 
 
There are no widely accepted criteria for what actually constitutes a Sharia scholar, or which of 
these scholars are allowed to give a halal certification for financial products. Only a few 
countries have identified specific criteria at the government level. Table IV (based on Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2007) shows a list of criteria to determine eligibility of Sharia scholars for a number 
of (Islamic) countries. In these cases, being an eligible Sharia scholar means that such a person is 
allowed to certify financial products as halal. In most cases though, it is not just one scholar that 
gives the certification, but a Sharia board, often consisting of three members. According to table 
IV and to the best of our knowledge, Malaysia and Pakistan are the only countries that have 
detailed and specific requirements for people wanting to become halal certifiers of financial 
products. In Malaysia, these certifiers (also called Sharia advisors) have to be registered with the 
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Malaysian Securities Commission. They have to apply for a registration and meet "fit and proper 
criteria", which for example include a minimum Bachelor's degree in Fiqh Al Muamalat and at 
least 2 years of experience in Islamic finance. This list of registered Sharia advisors is publicly 
available8. Interestingly, the list shows only 45 names. Looking back at Panel B of table II 
reveals that only 5 of the top 20 scholars are registered Sharia advisors. Clearly, such registration 
is not yet taken seriously by the industry. In Pakistan, a minimum level of education and 
experience as well as minimum grades are required. In most other countries, the criteria for 
assessing Sharia scholar eligibility is undeveloped. Many countries do not specify any criteria 
and most others only specify vague claims such as "members must have the proper experience" 
and "show honesty and integrity". The fourth column of table IV show that only three countries 
have set limits to the number of Sharia board positions a scholar may have. Malaysia and 
Pakistan allow only 1, while Indonesia allows 4. The case of Malaysia is troubling, since the top 
two Sharia scholars (Nizam Mohammed Yacoubi and Abdul Satar Adbul Karim Abu Ghuddah) 
both have 85 board positions and are clearly violating this rule. Still, they are both on Malaysia's 
Securities Commission registered Sharia advisor list. 
 
Table IV: Fit & Proper Criteria for Sharia Scholars 
 
Country Fit & Proper Criteria Criteria Based on
Restrictions on 
Board positions
Required Board 
members
Bahrain
General integrity, reputation, competence, experience and 
conflict of interest clauses.
Bahrain Monetary Agency 
(BMA) Rule Book, Volume 2, LR-
1A.2 Unspecified Minimum 3
DIFC
Competence (based on previous experience and 
qualifications), conflict of interest (may not be directors or 
controllers of the institution they are reviewing)
DFSA Rulebook: Islamic 
Financial Business Module Unspecified Minimum 3
Indonesia
Integrity (not on Disqualified List of Bank Indonesia), 
competence (have knowledge of and experience in Fiqh 
Muamalat, and knowledge of banking/finance), financial 
reputation (no history of bankruptcy)
Bank Indoneisa Regulation 
Number: 11/3/PBI/2009 Max 4
Minimum 2, Maximum 
50% of number of Board 
of Directors
Jordan Unspecified
Jordan Banking Law of 2000, 
Law No. 28 of 2000, as 
amended by temporary Law 
No.46 of 2003 Unspecified Unspecified
Kuwait Unspecified Kuwait Law No.30 of 2003 Minimum 3
Lebanon
Unspecified (background must be in Islamic law and 
finance/banking) Lebanon Law No. 575 Unspecified 3
Malaysia
A number of criteria, among others: Must be a Muslim, must 
be a registered with the Malaysia Securities Commission, 
minimum bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution in 
Fiqh Muamalat, minimum of 2 years experience in Islamic 
finance, proficiency in Arabic and English, must attend at 
least 75% of Sharia Committee meetings and intergrity and 
conflict of interest clauses.
Ammendmant of Central Bank 
of Malaysia Act 1958, 
Guidelines on the Governance 
of Shariah Committee for the 
Islamic
Financial Institutions, 
BNM/GPS1 Max 1 per industry Unspecified
Pakistan 
Minimum 4 years of experience in religious rulings, at least a 
Shahadat ul Aalmia degree  (a standardized Sharia based 
educational program) from any recognized Board of Madaris 
with minimum 70% marks and Bachelor’s Degree with a 
minimum of 2nd Class, sufficient understanding of banking 
and finance, integrity and conflict of interest clauses.
State Bank of Pakistan, IBD 
Circular No. 02 of 2004, 
Annexure-IV, Revised vide IBD 
Circular 2 of 2007 Max 1 Minimum 1
Philippines
Unspecified, members must be Islamic scholars and
jurists of comparative law
Manual of Regulations for 
Banks, Implementing Rules and 
Regulations of Republic Act No. 
6848 Unspecified Minimum 2, Maximum 5
Thailand
Financial integrity, competence, honesty and conflicts of 
interests.
Islamic Bank of Thailand Act 
B.E2545. Unspecified Maximum 4
UAE Unspecified Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 Unspecified Minimum 3  
 
Source: Grais and Pellegrini (2007) and country websites 
                                                 
8 http://www.sc.com.my/main.asp?pageid=253&menuid=280&newsid=&linkid=&type=#a  
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IV The halal certification process 
 
The halal certification process for financial products is costly and lengthy. The scheme presented 
in Figure 1 is based on a Requests For Proposals (RFP) that we have sent to a number of Sharia 
advisory firms for the certification of an Islamic Equity Fund (IEF) 9. IEFs are very similar to 
conventional mutual funds, except they exclude firms from industries that are considered 
unethical such as alcohol and pornography and firms with high leverage (usually a leverage ratio 
of no more than 33percent is allowed). IEFs have become very popular among Muslim investors 
in recent years, even though they have been found to underperform the Islamic market in many 
cases (e.g. Hayat and Kraeussl, 2011; Hoepner et al., 2011). 
 
In the RFP we asked for an overview of the certification process and the costs. We received a 
reply from 8 such companies, for which 6 provided an overviews of the certification process. 
From this, we constructed a typical halal certification process for a plain vanilla Islamic financial 
product. 
 
Figure 1: The Halal Certification Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sample of authors’ RFPs sent to Sharia advisory companies 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the first part of the process is finding and contracting a party that is able and 
willing to provide a certification. Based on our sample, this process takes approximately 3-4  
weeks. It is also the stage in which the panel of Sharia scholars (the Sharia board) is assembled 
that will actually certify the product. The party looking for certification has to make a choice 
here to develop the legal structure of the product itself and run the risk of having it completely 
rejected or developing it in cooperation with the certifier but incurring higher costs. In the second 
stage, the main legal documents are drafted and subjected to a preliminary review. A Pre and 
                                                 
9 We sent the same email (available on request) to all the companies. In this email we described some very basic 
characteristics of the fund, namely that it has an approximate size of EUR 200 mln, invests in listed equities, is 
targeted mostly for institutional investors and has a geographical focus. For confidentiality reasons, we do not report 
the company names. 
 Detailed review of the security’s legal 
documents
 Compilation of Pre and Interim Sharia 
Examination Reports (PSER and 
ISER respectively)
 Amendments to the security’s 
structure are proposed
 Post amendment review of legal 
documents and structure of security
 Final Sharia Examination Report 
(FSER)
 The party wishing to receive a 
halal certification for a security 
finds a party offering these 
services
 The client explains the scope of 
the project and requests a 
proposal for the offered services.
 The certification party replies to 
the Request for Proposal and 
describes its exact services.
 Both parties agree to a contract 
describing their rights and 
obligations
 The certification party mobilises a 
team, consisting of Sharia 
scholars and other employees
 Periodic monitoring of 
Sharia compliance
 Review frequency: 
quarterly or annually 
depending on the type of 
product
 The Sharia Advisory Board reviews 
the FSER and issues a fatwa
declaring the security halal
Finding and contracting 
a certification party Pre certification Certification Post certification
3 - 4 weeks 8 -10 weeks 2 - 3 days Continuous
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Interim Sharia report is written, containing proposed changes in the products (legal) structure. 
The client incorporates these changes in the product and re-submits the legal documents to the 
certifier. Based on the revised documents, a final Sharia report is written, which is sent for 
review to the Sharia board. The third stage is the actual certification. Here, the Sharia board 
reviews the final Sharia report and accepts or rejects the product as being halal. This process 
takes approximately 2-3 days. It results in a document provided to the client with a signed 
statement by the Sharia board that the relevant financial product is deemed halal. The final stage 
is an ongoing process in which the Sharia board regularly re-assesses the product and retains or 
withdraws the certification. Depending on the product, this takes place annually or quarterly. 
 
The conclusion from our request and the answers we obtained is that involvement from the 
certifier is required from the beginning of the structuring process. Also, the certification itself 
requires a relatively small amount of time (2-3 days), but the pre certification process is quite 
lengthy. A large part of the pre certification process is finding and contracting a certifier. Finally, 
to keep the certification, continuous monitoring is required. The fact that it takes a considerable 
amount of time to get a financial product certified as halal could hinder the industry’s growth. 
Benaissa, Jopart and Tanrikulu (2007) give the example of an Islamic bank in the Gulf region 
that developed a new financial product in two months, but had to wait three months to obtain 
halal certification. 
 
Apart from the time delay in getting a financial product halal certified, the costs of certification 
are important. There is only some anecdotal evidence on the actual costs of getting a halal 
certification for financial products (e.g. Morais, 2007 and Devi, 2008). In order to get a fair 
estimate, in the previously mentioned RFPs, we explicitly asked in our request for a description 
of the costs. Of the 8 companies that replied, 7 gave an indication of these costs. There are two 
cost components, a fixed payment for the initial certification and a periodic payment for (annual) 
re-certification, which must be paid throughout the life of the product. Based on our sample of 
RFPs, table II and other data from Funds@Work, we conducted a back of the envelope estimate 
of the market size for financial halal certificates. Table V shows the results. The fixed costs 
range from USD 25K to USD 125K and the annual costs range from USD 6K to 60K10 with 
averages of USD 88K and 34K for fixed and annual costs respectively. So on average, obtaining 
a halal certificate for a plain vanilla financial product will cost a substantial amount of money, 
around USD 122K the first year and USD 34K in the years thereafter. These costs are similar to 
the fees charged by credit rating agencies, which have been estimated be around USD 100K at 
initiation of a financial product (Faux, 2011) and around USD 45K per year thereafter (The Allen 
Consulting Group, 2004). The overall market for these certificates is small though when set 
against the total size of the Islamic Finance industry. Given the number of current Sharia board 
positions (1141) and the average costs per board (USD 122K), we arrive at an estimate of USD 
139 mln. Moreover, if we assume that the high end costs are typical for at least the top three 
Sharia scholars, we can give a rough estimate of their annual income, which we estimate to be 
around USD 4.5 mln per scholar11. Per person these amounts are quite substantial and make the 
                                                 
10The ranges are based on overall minima and maxima. They cannot be interpreted to say that the cheapest 
certification is USD 32K (6K +25K). The cheapest overall costs for certification we found was USD 85K. 
11 Calculated as the product of the total costs per certification (USD 185K) and the total number of board positions 
of the top three scholars (241), divided by the average size per board (3.3.) and the sample size (3). 
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scholars very prone to opportunistic behavior. They have a strong incentive to be excessively 
lenient in giving halal certifications. 
 
Table V: Size of Financial Halal Certification Market 
 
Market Size (USD 000s)
Costs per board
Fixed, max 125
Annual, max 60
Fixed, min 25
Annual, min 6
Fixed, average 88
Annual, average 34
Total 122
Total number of board positions 1.141
Market Size average (USD mln) 138.795
Average members per board 3,3
Estimated average salary of top 3 advisors 4.504  
 
Sources: Funds@Work, received Request For Proposals and authors’ estimations. 
 
 
V. Halal certification as a standard 
 
Transaction cost economics considers opportunistic behavior as one of reasons of the existence 
of transaction costs. The aim of standardization and certification is to confine the possibilities for 
opportunistic behavior. That is why lessons from transaction cost theory, and in general, from the 
theory of new institutional economics, can be useful for a discussion on how the value creating 
potential of halal certification can be enhanced. 
 
Quality standards in general, including halal certification, can potentially reduce transaction 
costs as less information on quality and other product characteristics has to be collected and price 
negotiations can be streamlined,. The economic theory of transaction costs developed by Coase 
(1937, 2005) was subsequently elaborated by Williamson (1975), who defines transaction costs 
as “the costs of running the economic system" . Nowadays, the term transaction costs mainly 
relates to the transaction itself: it covers all costs involved in entering into, implementing and 
complying with a transaction. A distinction can be made between “hard” and “soft” transaction 
costs (Den Butter, 2012). Hard transaction costs include observable costs such as transport costs, 
import duties and customs tariffs. The soft costs comprise all costs of making and monitoring 
contracts, information costs, costs due to cultural differences and miscommunication, unwritten 
laws, trust building, networking, risk costs, costs due to safety regulations and provisions, and so 
on. Halal certification aims to reduce these soft transaction costs.  
 
Three sources of transaction costs can be distinguished, namely: bounded rationality, 
opportunistic behaviour and asset specificity, all of which play a role in halal certification. 
 
Bounded rationality has two reasons: (a) information complexity and (b) information 
uncertainty. Information complexity refers to the fact that individuals have limited abilities to 
process all available information. Hence, an individual is unable to process all relevant aspects of 
a transaction. Informational uncertainty, by contrast, refers to the fact that it is impossible to 
 13
perfectly foresee all future states of the world. Halal certification can ideally relieve much of the 
informational complexity and uncertainty so that transaction costs associated with this bounded 
rationality are reduced. Information asymmetry arrises when one party in a transaction has more 
information about the characteristics of a product (including its quality). Dranove and Jin (2010) 
argue that in markets characterized by information asymmetries, a mechanism that ensures 
quality such as certification, if conducted properly, has the capacity to increase welfare through 
two mechanisms. First it facilitates matches between sellers and buyers. Second, it allows 
consumers to buy products that fit their idiosyncratic needs, a process which Dranove and Jin 
refer to as horizontal sorting.  
 
Transaction costs theory can also help us identify the limits of halal certification. According to 
Dranove and Jin, the potential for welfare increase is even larger for credence goods, which are 
goods of which the quality cannot be verified even after purchase. Halal certificates are a typical 
example of such credence goods. Their quality (in the sense of being halal or not) cannot 
accurately be verified even after their purchase, which exacerbates information asymmetries 
between buyers and sellers. Even if the buyer of a financial asset has some knowledge on how to 
evaluate whether it is halal, he can not truly verify this. What is acceptable to one school of 
thought may not be so for another school. 
 
It has already been mentioned that the high financial rewards may induce Sharia scholars to 
opportunistic behaviour. When individuals exhibit opportunistic, they may use the 
incompleteness in contracts, which exist through bounded rationality, for their own gains. This 
opens up opportunities for strategic behaviour and executive hazards. This in turn causes the 
necessity for trading partners to monitor each other and to enforce contracts legally. In the case 
of opportunistic behaviour of Sharia scholars it implies that there is not much value in their 
certification of financial products so that the certification does not contribute to reduce the 
transaction costs. 
 
Finally, asset specificity is defined as the extent to which an investment supporting a transaction 
has more value in that specific transaction than in any other purpose. Asset specificity 
determines the scope of the continuing interest of both contracting parties in each other 
(Williamson, 1985). When there is no asset specificity, markets are perfectly contestable, and 
individuals will not want to invest in continuing economic relationships. Asset specificity relates 
to goods or services that are bound to certain specifications. When the first transaction has been 
defined and approved with respect to these specifications, the following transactions can take 
advantage of the fact that the specifications are known and thereby fewer transaction costs need 
to be made. By contrast, the more goods or services are tailored to the individual requirements of 
the buyer, the higher the asset specificity. If someone wants to buy an Islamic financial asset, for 
example a non listed company, he or she will have to invest considerable time and money to 
assess whether it is actually halal. Such investments are quite specific and include for example 
detailed knowledge of Fiqh Al Muamalat. Such investments will not benefit that person much in 
other transactions, they are tied to buying Islamic assets. It is a well established concept in 
transaction cost economics that due to opportunistic behavior underinvestment will occur in 
relationships requiring specific investments (Nunn, 2007). In our example, the opportunistic 
behavior arises because the seller of a halal financial product might game the buyer by asking a 
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higher price after the buyer has already invested in the relationship. The buyer will anticipate 
such “hold up” behaviour and consequently underinvest in the relationship. 
 
It is obvious that there is a relationship between asset specificity and standardization. 
Standardization will make the specifications transparent and, therefore, reduce asset specificity. 
Uniform standards ensure that traders need to spend less time defining the specifications of the 
goods or services, so that they will encounter fewer transaction costs. This would be equally true 
for good and uniform halal certification as a quality standard. 
 
 
VI. Recommendations 
 
The previous discussion shows that in practice halal certification is plagued by the same 
problems as the Islamic financial products themselves. There is no consensus on what is 
considered halal and it requires considerable time and money to get a halal certification, mainly 
due to the high fees of Sharia scholars. Moreover, these high fees can induce the Sharia scholars 
to opportunistic behaviour. How can these problems be mitigated? Below, we discuss a number 
of possible solutions:  
 
Certify the certifiers: A single outside party that governs the market for certifiers is a good 
idea, but can only be successful if such a party is independent. Currently, such a role is attempted 
by the AAOIFI and IFSB, who seem to lack this crucial quality. Grais and Pellegrini (2007) 
indicate that there are also national Sharia boards (Central Sharia Boards) in Malaysia, Kuwait, 
UAE, Indonesia, Sudan and Pakistan. However, more than one governing party raises chances 
for differing opinions. Furthermore, the current national Sharia boards are mainly concerned 
with standardization of Sharia interpretation and disputes within Sharia boards. This solution 
also raises the question of who governs the many certifiers of certifiers in those cases. 
 
Allow more competition: Competition in certifier markets could also work, but is problematic 
when the underlying assets are complex (Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009) or the certification process 
is not transparent (Farhi, Lerner and Tirole, 2008)12. Both can be argued for halal financial 
products. In such cases, competition will lead sellers to shop around for favorable certification. 
In addition, Becker and Milbourn (2011) find that competition (in the case of credit ratings) can 
also lead to inflated and lower quality ratings through another mechanism than shopping around. 
It reduces the incentive for certifiers to provide high quality ratings due to lower expected future 
profits as a result of the increased competition. 
 
Disclose conflict of interest: The problem here is that consumers often do not properly discount 
advice from certifiers even if they disclose a possible bias (Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005). 
Cain et al., argue that certifiers might strategically take advantage of this fact and give even more 
biased ratings. The certifiers may even feel "morally licensed" to do so since any conflict of 
interest has already been disclosed. 
 
                                                 
12 The latter may warrant some explanation. Sellers have an extra incentive to shop around for certification when 
the application process is not transparent because they do not fear that prior rejections of certification become 
widely known. 
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Reputation: Some authors downplay certifier bias in Islamic finance, arguing that it will be 
mitigated by reputation effects (e.g. Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). Sharia scholars that get the 
reputation of being too lenient in giving halal ratings will suffer reputation loss and thus refrain 
from such activities. However, Mathis et al. (2009) show that (for credit rating agencies), 
reputation will only discipline certifiers when a large fraction of their income comes from 
certifying simple assets. When assets become complex certification become less stringent, 
especially when the certifier's reputation is good. In addition, Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2009) 
show that (also for rating agencies), certifiers will inflate ratings when consumers are naïve or 
when the expected reputation loss from rating inflation is low. 
 
Make certification non profit: The lessons from new institutional economics show that a 
single, external, neutral and non profit party that gives Sharia ratings can be a good solution. It 
may seem unrealistic to avoid at least some partiality here. The members of this central 
certification party would likely include at least some of the current top Sharia scholars. 
However, let us assume that it is not deemed necessary that financial Sharia scholars must be 
scholars in Islamic commercial law with knowledge of finance and that they could also be 
experts in finance with knowledge of Islamic commercial law. In that case, a country with good 
institutional quality and financial talent could specialize in such certification and provide it on a 
non profit base to the Islamic financial community. The individual scholars earn a fixed salary 
and are possibly limited in the amount of products they can certify. The Islamic financial 
community then pays for this as a collective. It requires (international) governmental 
intervention though since such certification becomes a public good. Free rider problems will 
otherwise prevent its inception. We acknowledge that such a solution is an idealized and still far 
remote one, but nevertheless it provides at least a model to strive to. Moreover it prevents that 
halal certification of financial products eventually ends up in the lock-in of a “two winner” 
market with Bahrain and Malaysia as domiciles of the major certifiers. 
 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
In principle, halal certification by a Sharia scholar can reduce the asymmetries of information 
and the related transaction costs. Muslims no longer have to assess whether a financial product is 
halal themselves, thereby avoiding transaction costs such as investing time to learning Islamic 
law and monitoring costs. However, in practice halal certification itself still entails high explicit 
(hard) as well as implicit (soft) transaction costs. The explicit costs for certifying a typical 
financial product (an investment fund) are estimated to be around USD 122,000 per annum for 
the first year and USD 34,000 per annum in the following years. The implicit costs which arise 
among others due to the relatively large amount of time it takes for certification, are estimated to 
be between 11 and 14 weeks on average. As yet it is remains difficult to assess whether the 
Sharia scholar (certifier) has done its job right.  
 
There are also a number of additional problems. First, there is no consensus on what constitutes 
halal due to different schools of thought on Islamic law. 
 
Second, the market for halal certification of financial products it is highly concentrated and 
consists of a rather closed circle of just a handful of individuals. Although there are around 400 
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Sharia scholars, the top 20 supply more than half the market, earning monopoly like rents. 
Especially the top scholars make substantial amounts of money. We estimate the top 3 to make 
an average of USD 4.5 million per year. Entrance to this position is difficult. The top scholars 
enjoy substantial brand values, there is a large difference in costs from getting a certification 
from a well known scholar as opposed to one that is less well known. There is thus a clear risk of 
what Dranove and Jin call a certifier bias. The certifiers have a strong incentive to be excessively 
lenient in giving halal certificates to attract business. There is ample evidence of such certifier 
bias in related industries such as credit ratings (e.g. Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet 2009; 
Bolton et al., 2009) and stock recommendation (e.g. Hong and Kubik, 2003). For Islamic finance 
specifically it has also been noted by El Gamal (2006). 
 
Third, Sharia scholars often work together and sit in standard setting bodies (e.g. the AAOIFI) 
that aim to supervise the industry. The latter indicates that some of these certifiers are 
supervising themselves, which many would perceive as bad governance. 
 
Fourth, the competence of Sharia scholars in evaluating complex financial products is 
questionable. Our findings indicate that Malaysia and Pakistan are the only Muslim countries 
that have specific criteria for becoming a financial halal certifier. Theoretically, anyone with 
proper knowledge of Islamic commercial law (Fiqh Al Muamalt) could qualify. In practice, 
many of these certifiers have PhDs in Fiqh Al Muamalat, mostly from Egyptian and Saudi 
Arabian universities such as Al Azhar University and Imam Muhammed Ibn Saud Islamic 
University. But less than 40percent have degrees in Economics, Finance or Management. As 
financial innovations might get increasingly complex, it could harm the credibility of these 
Sharia scholars. 
 
In order to deal with these problems we propose several solutions such as: a certifier for 
certifiers, more competition, disclosure of conflict, reputation loss and making certification non-
profit. The last solution has some important policy implications: a neutral country with high 
governance quality should specialize in the oversight of halal certifiers. This oversight should 
preferably be non-profit. 
 
A suggestion for further research is that a halal certification might also contain information 
about the risk and return characteristics of certain financial products, such as Islamic Equity 
Funds (IEFs). Since IEFs are only allowed to invest in stocks with low leverage, they might 
favor growth stocks (e.g. Hoepner et al., 2011) and low beta stocks (e.g. Hayat and Kraeussl, 
2011). In this respect, the halal certification might also reduce transaction costs by providing risk 
return information to potential investors. Another suggestion is to find out whether Muslim 
investors are willing to accept less return on assets because they derive utility from investing in a 
Sharia compliant way. Elfenbein and McManus (2010) for example find that people are willing 
to pay more for products linked to charity, implying a utility effect of charity. Investing in a 
halal way might induce a similar effect. 
 
 17
 
References 
Becker, B. and T. Milbourn (2011), How Did Increased Competition Affect Credit Ratings?, 
 Journal of Financial Economics, 101(3), pp. 493-514. 
Benaissa, N-E., X. Jopart and O. Tanrikulu (2007), Rethinking Regulation for Islamic Banking, 
 The McKinsey Quarterly (March 2007 Special Edition: Reappraising the Gulf States). 
Butter, F.A.G. Den (2012), Managing Transaction Costs in the Era of Globalization, 
 Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, to appear. 
Bolton, P., X. Freixas and J. Shapiro (2009), The Credit Ratings Game, National Bureau of 
 Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper no. 14712. 
Cain, D.M., G. Loewenstein and D.A. Moore (2005), The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse 
 Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, Journal of Legal Studies, 34(1), pp. 1-25. 
Coase, R.H. (1937), The nature of the firm, Economica 4(16), pp. 386-405. 
Coase, R.H. ( 2005), The institutional structure of production, Ch. 2, in: C. Ménard and M.M. 
 Shirley (eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Berlin: Springer, pp. 31-39. 
Devi, S. (2008), Scholars and Harmony in Short Supply, Financial Times, 17 June. 
Dranove, D. and G.Z. Jin (2010), Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice, 
 Journal of Economic Literature, 48(4), pp. 935-936. 
Elfenbein, D.W, and B. McManus (2010), A Greater Price for a Greater Good? Evidence That 
 Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products, American Economic Journal: 
 Economic Policy, 2(2), pp. 28-60. 
El Gamal, M.A. (2006), Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice, Cambridge University 
 Press, New York. 
El Gamal. M.A. (2008), Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance: The Trade-Off Between Brand 
 Name Distinctiveness and Convergence, Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic 
 Law 1(1). 
Farhi, E., J. Lerner and J. Tirole (2008), Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and 
 Transparency, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper no. 
 14457. 
Faux, Z., S&P, Moody’s Boosting Rating Fees Faster Than Inflation, Bloomberg News, 15 
 November 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-15/credit-rating-fees-rise- 
 faster-than-inflation-as-governments-fret-expenses.html  
General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (GCIBAFI), (2009). Islamic 
 Finance in the World 2009, Report published by the Information and Financial Analysis 
 Center of GCIBAFI, http://www.cibafi.org/Images/Attaches/2010102444426421.pdf 
Grais, W. and M. Pellegrini (2006), Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic 
 Financial Services, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4054. 
Grais, W. and M. Pellegrini (2007), Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic 
 Financial Services: Issues and Options, Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and 
 Finance, 3(1). 
Jobst, A., P. Kunzel, P. Mills and A. Sy (2008), Islamic Bond Issuance: What Sovereign Debt 
 Managers Need to Know, International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance 
 and Management 1(4), pp. 330-344. 
Hayat, R. and R. Kraeussl (2011), Risk and Return Characteristics of Islamic Equity Funds, 
 Emerging Markets Review, 12(2), pp. 189-203. 
 18
Hoepner, A.G.F., H.G. Rammal and M. Rezec (2011), Islamic Mutual Funds’ Financial 
 Performance and International Investment Style: Evidence From 20 Countries, The 
 European Journal of Finance, DOI:10.1080/1351847X.2010.538521. 
Hong, H., and J.D. Kubik (2003), Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings 
 Forecasts, Journal of Finance, 58(1), pp. 313-351. 
Khan, F. (2010), How Islamic is Islamic Banking?, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
 Organization, 76(3), pp. 805-820. 
Kuran, T. (2004), Islam & Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism. Princeton 
 University Press, Princeton. 
Lizzeri, A. (1999), Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries, The RAND Journal 
 of Economics, 30(2), pp. 214-231. 
Mathis, J., J. McAndrews and J-C. Rochet (2009), Rating the Raters: Are Reputation Concerns 
 Powerful Enough to Discipline Rating Agencies?, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
 56(5), pp. 657-674. 
Mizuno, T., M. Toriyama, T. Terano and M. Takayasu (2008), Pareto Law of the Expenditure of 
 a Person in Convenience Stores, Physica A, 387, pp. 3931-3935. 
Morais, R.C. (2007), Don’t Call It Interest, Forbes, 23 July, pp. 122-132. 
Nunn, N. (2007), Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern  of Trade, 
 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), pp. 569-600. 
Schilling, M.A. (2002), Technology Success and Failure in Winner-Take-All Markets: the 
 Impact of Learning Orientation, Timing and Network Externalities, Academy of 
 Management Journal, 45(2), pp.387-398. 
Shanmugam, B. and Z.R. Zahari (2009), A primer on Islamic Finance, Research Foundation 
 Publications of CFA Institute, Charlottesville. 
Skreta, V. and L. Veldkamp (2009), Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A  Theory of 
 Ratings Inflation, Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(5), pp. 678-695. 
The Allen Consulting Group (2004), Debt and Equity Raising Transaction Costs, Report to The 
 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, December 2004 
Visser, H. (2009), Islamic Finance, Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton. 
Williamson, O.E., 1975, Markets and Hierachies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New 
 York, Free Press. 
Williamson, O.E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press.  
